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THE TRANSFORMATION OF STATE 
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE ROME 
STATUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 
Michael J. Struett* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has become popular in recent years to suggest that state 
sovereignty, as a phenomenon in the international legal system, 
is in decline.1  One such challenge to state sovereignty is the 
empowerment of international organizations or institutions to 
make binding decisions in areas that historically have been the 
prerogative of sovereign states.  A prime example of this 
phenomenon is the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The 
states party to the ICC statute, also known as the Rome Statute, 
grant the court considerable authority over the prosecution of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, when those 
crimes are committed by the member state’s citizens or on its 
territory.2  It has been alleged by the United States that, in 
addition to the voluntary sacrifice of sovereign authority by 
states party to the ICC, the new ICC also infringes on the 
sovereign rights of non-state parties.3  This would occur if the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court modifies the 
sovereign rights of both state parties and non-state parties. 
State sovereignty, however, remains a foundational norm of 
 
*Ph.D. candidate, International Relations, University of California Irvine; M.A. George 
Washington University, 1998; B.A. University of California Berkeley, 1995.  Email: 
mstruett@uci.edu.  The author thanks Wayne Sandholtz and Steven Weldon for helpful 
comments on this work, and the editorial staff of the Chapman Law Review, especially 
Anthony Geraci for improving the article. 
 1 JAMES N. ROSENAU, TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE AND 
CONTINUITY 40 (Princeton University Press 1990). See generally Oscar Schachter, The 
Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for International Law, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 7 (1997). 
 2 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 
999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 3 David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 529, 533-34 (1999). 
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the international legal system.  This article will examine the 
challenges to state sovereignty that are brought about under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but will argue 
that these are developments of the concept of state sovereignty 
and not a radical departure from it.  Viewed from this 
perspective, arguments by the United States government that 
the Rome Statute violates the sovereign rights of non-state 
parties4 have little merit, as the principles of the ICC statute are 
well in line with the traditional state sovereignty norms that are 
the foundation of international law.  The essential impact on 
non-state parties’ sovereignty is that nationals of such states who 
commit crimes on the territory of states party to the ICC statute 
could potentially be punished for their crimes before the new 
international court.  However, under the traditional rules of 
international law, nationals of a foreign state are normally 
subject to the laws of the state where they are traveling.5  
Consequently, to the extent that the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court creates obligations for non-state 
parties, it does so in a way that is perfectly consistent with the 
foundational international law norm of state sovereignty.  States 
that consent to become parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court do engage in a significant 
redefinition of their sovereign rights and responsibilities, but 
they do so in a way that is consistent with the gradual evolution 
of the concept of state sovereignty over the centuries.  Therefore, 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court does not 
radically undermine the concept of state sovereignty; instead, it 
modifies sovereignty norms in a direction that promises to permit 
the continued utility of the concept for international law in the 
twenty-first century. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
A. Sovereignty as a Social Construct 
State sovereignty is a foundational legal concept of 
international law which holds that states should have autonomy 
to act, and be free from, unwanted intrusions by other states.6  
However, the precise rule content of the sovereignty concept has 
changed a great deal over time.  For instance, it was once 
 
 4 Pierre-Richard Prosper, Foreign Press Center Briefing (May 6, 2002), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/9965.htm. 
 5 Covey T. Oliver, The Jurisdiction (Competence) of States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 307, 309 (M. Bedjaoui ed. 1991). 
 6 State sovereignty is defined as “[t]he right of a state to self-government; the 
supreme authority exercised by each state.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1446 (8th ed. 
2004). 
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accepted that one of the privileges of sovereign states was the 
right to use force in world politics.  Today, in contrast, the 
concept of state sovereignty includes the right to be free from 
armed attack on a state’s sovereign territory.7  I accept the notion 
articulated by Werner and others that sovereignty is a 
conceptual category of international law whose specific content 
changes over time through the discursive practices of states.8  As 
Werner puts clearly: 
State sovereignty is not a descriptive concept which stands for 
(‘mirrors’) a pre-given state of affairs and which can be measured and 
counted in an objective way.  The very fact that collapsed states still 
count as sovereign states in international law suggests otherwise.  
Rather than being a representation of a state of affairs, state 
sovereignty is a claim to authority; a claim which has been 
institutionalized, defined and redefined within the framework of 
international law.9 
This perspective is at odds with the view that sovereignty is 
an actual political characteristic of independent political entities 
that have de facto political autonomy.  In such a view, 
international law simply takes note of that empirical situation.10  
I assume, instead, that the discourse of international law has 
substantiated the conceptual category of sovereignty.  The 
existence of a body of law based on the principle of the 
independence of sovereign states has legitimized and 
institutionalized the existence of political forms that claim the 
status of sovereign states.  Moreover, the particular bundle of 
rights and duties that sovereign states claim to possess as a 
result of qualifying for legal sovereign status has changed 
considerably over time. 
Biersteker and Weber elaborate on the view that sovereignty 
is a socially constructed legal concept whose exact content 
changes considerably over time.  They assert that: 
Sovereignty provides the basis in international law for claims for state 
actions, and its violation is routinely invoked as a justification for the 
use of force in international relations.  Sovereignty, therefore, is an 
inherently social concept.  States’ claims to sovereignty construct a 
social environment in which they can interact as an international 
society of states, while at the same time the mutual recognition of 
 
 7 Wouter Werner, State Sovereignty and International Legal Discourse, in 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 127 (Wouter G. Werner & Ige F. 
Dekker eds., 2004). 
 8 Id. at 131-33. 
 9 Id. at 133 (emphasis added). 
 10 For an articulation of the view that sovereignty is an empirical phenomenon that 
is merely recognized by international law, see generally ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN 
STATEHOOD, THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (Allen & Unwin 1986). 
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claims to sovereignty is an important element in the construction of 
states themselves.11 
Thus, sovereignty is a social fact.  States exist as meaningful 
entities because they are constituted by international law rules of 
recognition.  At the same time, states constitute those 
institutional rules of international law by interacting in ways 
that develop and modify the meaning of sovereignty over time.  
The relationship between states, as agents, and international 
law, as an institution, is mutually constitutive.12  While the 
specific rules of conduct for sovereign states shift over time, the 
sovereignty idea always refers to some capacity of the state to act 
independently from other sources of authority.13 
One consequence of the view that sovereignty is a socially 
constructed phenomenon is that it is no longer necessary to view 
the international norm of state sovereignty and the norm of 
individual human rights as existing in opposition to one 
another.14  Instead, constructivist scholars of international 
relations have argued that, since 1945, with the era of de-
colonization and self-determination, the obligation of sovereign 
states to protect the individual human rights of their citizens has 
become essential to legitimizing the existence of the international 
state system itself.15  The reason for the legitimacy of the state 
system in earlier centuries was the divine right of kings, but, 
since the middle of the twentieth century, the foundational 
reason for the existence of modern states is to protect the most 
basic human rights of their populations.  As Reus-Smit puts it: 
“Far from being a categorical right with no strings attached, 
therefore, the post-1945 right to self-determination was 
deliberately and explicitly tied to the satisfaction of basic human 
rights.”16 
 
 11 Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber, The Social Construction of State 
Sovereignty, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 1, 1-2 (Thomas J. Biersteker & 
Cynthia Weber eds. 1996) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 12 On the sociology of agents and structures, see generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (University of 
California Press 1984).  With respect to states and international society, see ALEXANDER 
WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 67 (1999). 
 13 Biersteker & Weber, supra note 11, at 14. 
 14 For the opposite view that the ICC is a challenge to states’ sovereign rights, rather 
than a transformation of them, see Rod Jensen, Globalization and the International 
Criminal Court:  Accountability and a New Conception of State, in GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 170-71 (Wouter G. Werner & Ige F. Dekker eds., 2004). 
 15 Christian Reus-Smit, Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty, 
27 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 519, 519-20, 531-36 (2001). 
 16 Id. at 536. 
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B. Sovereignty and the Juridical Equality of States 
Of course, a crucial aspect of the legal concept of state 
sovereignty is the juridical equality of the states in the 
international system.  However, Michael Byers notes the fiction 
of legal equality masks significant differences in a state’s actual 
power, and those power differences suggest that states have 
differing abilities to influence the content of international law.17  
Byers argues that powerful states tend to be more engaged in the 
international system, and, therefore, their acts have a 
disproportionate impact on the evolution of customary 
international law.  Additionally, they tend to maintain larger 
diplomatic corps that give them added influence in bilateral and 
multilateral treaty drafting.  As I have argued elsewhere, one of 
the consequences of the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court is that it gives judges of that court substantial 
authority to direct the evolution of the practical application of the 
laws of war.18  I elaborate on this power of the ICC below.  This 
power to define the law comes partly at the expense of powerful 
states that have historically determined the application of the 
rules of international humanitarian law through their own 
practices of discourse and prosecution. 
Critical legal theorists have noted that international law, 
like virtually all legal orders, is not inherently fair in its 
application precisely because power plays a role in the 
development and application of the law.19  One important change 
in the legal rights of sovereign states that ratify the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court is that they grant 
significant authority to the Court’s prosecutor and judges to 
determine whether or not particular actions carried out by 
individuals constitute violations of international humanitarian 
law.  As a consequence, the establishment of the Court shifts real 
legal control from the great powers towards this newly 
constituted international judiciary.  Since military powers 
historically defined the application of international criminal law 
standards to their own soldiers, personnel, and citizens, they 
exercised enormous discretion over the practical definition of the 
crimes mentioned under the Geneva Protocols of 1949 or the 
 
 17 MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-40 (Cambridge University Press 
1999). 
 18 Michael Struett, NGOs, the International Criminal Court, and the Politics of 
Writing International Law, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 327-28 
(Wouter G. Werner & Ige F. Dekker eds., 2004). 
 19 See generally DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 
(Basic Books 3d ed. 1998) (1982). 
STRUETT FINAL 6/21/2005 6:53 PM 
177 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 8:172 
Genocide Convention.20  If the judges of the ICC are fair and 
professional in their application of the standards, this 
development could weaken the argument that international law 
ultimately is a legal system that serves the interest of only the 
most powerful states that participate in the international legal 
system. 
C. Sovereignty and Individuals as Subjects of International 
Law 
Historically, individuals were not recognized as subjects of 
international law, and it was assumed that only states, not 
individuals, had rights and obligations under international 
criminal law.21  Chinese writers on international law have 
recently reiterated this view, claiming that international law 
gives no status to individuals on Chinese territory to claim rights 
against the state.22  However, this argument has been widely 
criticized as being the obvious manipulation of international law 
by totalitarian states to preserve its own absolute power.23  
Moreover, in the twentieth century, the view that individuals 
have both rights and obligations under international law has 
gained widespread acceptance.24  Indeed, since international law, 
like any legal system, is ultimately a standard for human 
behavior, it would seem to be a logical necessity that it would 
regulate individual human conduct, even if the formal 
constitution of international law is premised on specific acts 
undertaken by states as corporate entities.25 
International Criminal Law as a field rests upon the reality 
that states have deliberately created rights and duties for 
individuals under international treaties and customs.26  The 
International Criminal Court is a direct challenge to traditional 
conceptions of state sovereignty because it creates a 
supranational judicial authority with the power to rule whether 
 
 20 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res 
260 (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 174, U.N. Doc A/810, (Dec. 9, 1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 
entered into force January 12, 1951. 
 21 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of International Law, in 2 THE WORKS 537 (J. 
Bowring ed. 1843). 
 22 See generally Hungdah Chiu, Guojifa Xin Lingyu Jianlun (A Concise Introduction 
to the New Areas of International Law), 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 892 (1988) (book review). 
 23 See generally LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A POLICY ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE (1989). 
 24 See generally RICHARD A. FALK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVE (Westview Press 1985). 
 25 Id. at 205. 
 26 See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 1999); JORDAN J. 
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Carolina Academic Press 
2d ed. 2000). 
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or not particular uses of force by state officials are criminal and 
sanctionable violations of international law.27  This means that 
the court, and not states alone, will have the authority to help 
determine what constitutes a legal use of force.  Of course, the 
notion that states have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force 
within their territory is central to the legal concept of 
sovereignty.  That circumstance is not undermined by the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court, because the 
court does not constitute any new authority with police power.  
However, states that ratify the statute give the court a role in 
determining which particular uses of force are legitimate.28  
Consequently, the legal privileges of sovereignty are altered by 
the court’s establishment.  In effect, states that are parties to the 
ICC statute limit their own autonomy in determining whether or 
not the conduct of their public officials comports with obligations 
that states have adopted to limit their use of force. 
D. Popular Sovereignty and the Legal Concept of State 
Sovereignty 
State sovereignty is increasingly conceptualized as a 
phenomenon that creates both rights and responsibilities for 
governments.29  In effect, there is an emerging norm in 
international law that States owe certain obligations to their own 
citizens, and to the international community.30  The political 
liberty that comes with state sovereignty has to be tempered by a 
responsibility to exercise that liberty in a way that is not severely 
detrimental to people living inside or outside of the sovereign 
state’s jurisdiction.  For example, the emerging preference in the 
international legal system for democratic forms of government 
suggests that sovereign states have a legal obligation to consider 
the needs of the citizens of their state.31 
In all the states where the United Nations has recently been 
involved in “state-building” exercises after a period of war or 
other upheaval, democracy has repeatedly been the form of 
government preferred by international organizations and their 
members.32  This pattern of state practice suggests an emerging 
 
 27 Rome Statute, supra note 2. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://www.iciss. 
ca/pdf/commission-report.pdf. 
 30 See generally id. 
 31 See generally id. 
 32 See generally Sean D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of 
States and Governments, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 
(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000). 
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standard that participatory forms of political organization are to 
be preferred over forms of government where a political elite is 
not accountable to the general populace.33  This suggests that the 
legal concept of sovereignty in international law now focuses 
increasingly on the popular sovereignty of the citizenry rather 
than on the political sovereignty of the government.  The now 
extensive pattern of international treaties that recognize 
participatory political rights means there has been a shift in the 
locus of sovereignty.34  As Greg Fox writes, this “shift in the locus 
of sovereignty undermines arguments against participatory 
rights based on an infringement of sovereignty.  For a non-
democratic regime to claim that participatory rights violate its 
national sovereignty begs the question of whether that regime 
has legitimate authority to make such a statement.”35 
Another example of the increasing significance of the norm of 
state responsibility over taking the rights aspect of state 
sovereignty can be seen in the emergence of “The Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement” adopted by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.36  In this case, we are not dealing 
with legally binding law.  Still the development of workable 
norms in this area, their adoption by a major UN body, and their 
use in the field by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
other actors, all serve to reinforce the notion that sovereign 
states have responsibilities and not just rights.  The question of 
internally displaced persons is a classic example of a lacuna 
created in international law by the doctrine of absolute state 
sovereignty.37  Of course, persons displaced across international 
boundaries now benefit from a number of international law 
rights and privileges.  Conversely, persons displaced from their 
homes by armed conflict who remain within the boundaries of a 
sovereign state have more limited international legal rights 
because such persons are traditionally at the complete mercy of 
their sovereign state governments.38 
The development of the Guiding Principles for Internally 
Displaced Persons is a study in the growing recognition that 
states have obligations to their own citizens.  Roberta Cohen 
 
 33 Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 48, 71-86 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. 
Roth eds., 2000). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 89. 
 36 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Commission Human Rights, 
54th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998). 
 37 See generally Roberta Cohen, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: 
An Innovation in International Standard Setting, in 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 459 (2004). 
 38 Id. 
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writes: “[w]hile acknowledging that primary responsibility rests 
with national authorities, the Guiding Principles recast 
sovereignty as a form of national responsibility toward one’s 
vulnerable populations with a role provided for the international 
community when governments did not have the capacity or 
willingness to protect their uprooted populations.”39  We are 
witnessing the gradual strengthening of the notion of popular 
sovereignty in the international political normative order, at the 
expense of strict privileges of state sovereignty.  State 
sovereignty is increasingly only viewed as legitimate to the 
extent that it gives expression to the popular sovereignty rights 
of the people. 
The International Criminal Court creates new norms that 
are of precisely this type.  The primary effect of the ICC on 
member states’ sovereign rights is to create an important 
institutional incentive for member states to prosecute genocide, 
war crimes, or crimes against humanity when they occur on the 
states territory.  Since the ICC only has jurisdiction if states fail 
to prosecute themselves,40 the existence of the court puts 
pressure on states to exercise their own criminal jurisdiction over 
these crimes.  In the absence of the ICC, other things being 
equal, states would have more latitude to decide for themselves 
whether or not it was politically desirable to prosecute these 
types of cases.  Of course, states had already accepted the legal 
obligation to punish or extradite for genocide, if they ratified the 
1948 Genocide Convention, and grave breaches of the war crimes 
law, if they ratified the Geneva Conventions of 1949.41 
What is new about the ICC is that it threatens to proceed 
with international enforcement of these crimes if states fail to 
punish.  In effect, the ICC promises to uphold a certain minimal 
standard of compliance with the requirement on states to punish 
violations of international criminal law.  This can be viewed as 
recognizing the rights of the citizens of states to be free from 
victimization as a result of crimes recognized under international 
criminal law.  As such, it is a modification of the meaning of state 
sovereignty.  Of course, in some cases, states will be glad to shift 
 
 39 Id. at 459. 
 40 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17. 
 41 Regarding the duty to prosecute war crimes, see STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. 
ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 82 (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 2001).  Regarding 
the duty to prosecute Genocide, see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, supra note 20, arts. 6-7; but be aware of numerous reservations to 
these provisions.  See also STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 
39-40 (2001). 
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the burden of prosecution to the ICC rather than undertake such 
prosecutions themselves.  This possibility is discussed more 
below.  But for the majority of states, the incentive will clearly be 
to handle such matters within their own legal systems. 
III. BASIC POWERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
By creating an individual standard of accountability for 
violations of the laws of war, the International Criminal Court 
potentially places meaningful restrictions on the way states can 
employ organized violence.42  The four classes of crimes over 
which the ICC will have jurisdiction all involve international 
norms that restrict the way in which states can exercise the use 
of force.43  It does this by forcing state officials to consider the 
possible legal repercussions should the force be deemed 
inappropriate by outside legal authorities.  Historically, this fact 
was seen as the major political stumbling block to the 
establishment of a permanent ICC.44 
The establishment of the International Criminal Court also 
places restrictions on a state’s ability to determine for itself 
whether or not particular acts qualify as war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, or genocide.  The absence of a clearly specified 
international criminal code has also been seen as a major 
stumbling block to prosecuting international crimes in a court of 
law.45  Of course, there is no recognized legislative body in the 
international system.  Both customary and treaty based 
international law criminalize specific acts, but whether or not 
those crimes were sufficiently specified so as to make them 
enforceable in a court of law was debated before the 
establishment of the ICC.46  States have traditionally exercised a 
great deal of control over the content of international law, 
 
 42 Michael Struett, The Meaning of the International Criminal Court, 16 PEACE 
REVIEW 317, 319 (2004). 
 43 The four crimes are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
aggression.  Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5.  Significantly, the court will not exercise 
its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until the states who are parties to the Rome 
Statute agree on a definition of that crime.  Id.  Of course, non-state actors can also 
commit these crimes. 
 44 BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARD 
WORLD PEACE : A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, xii (Oceana Publications 1980).  
See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: Where They Stand 
and Where They’re Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 375, 375-81, 84. (1992); Michael P. 
Scharf, Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 103, 
111-13 (1994).  These works document the reluctance of states to define international law 
crimes with sufficient precision for an international criminal court to convict violators. 
 45 Scharf, Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court, supra note 44. 
 46 See generally Timothy C. Evered, An International Criminal Court: Recent 
Proposals and American Concerns, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 121 (1994); FERENCZ, supra note 
44. 
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including the ability to determine in large part through custom 
what is considered a war crime and what is not. 
The traditional sources of international law are primarily 
controlled by state governments.  Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice formally recognizes four sources of 
international law: treaties, custom, general principles of law, and 
the commentary of judicial decisions or leading publicists on 
international law.47  Sovereign states have control over the first 
two sources, since states conclude treaties and custom refers 
explicitly to the practice of states.  As a result, states have 
traditionally exercised a great deal of control over the content of 
international law, including the ability to determine in large part 
through custom what is considered a war crime and what is not.  
Since the general principles of law are essentially constant over 
time, and the role of commentary is a subsidiary one that is 
parasitic on the actual behavior of states, states historically have 
exercised a virtual monopoly on the actual legislation of 
international law. 
Within the last century, the doctrine that only sovereign 
states can be the authors of international law has come under 
challenge.48  To the extent that the resolutions of international 
organizations and decisions of international administrative 
bodies can have binding effects in law, at times by means of 
parliamentary style voting, as in the Security Council, or the 
General Assembly, or other international bodies, this introduces 
an element in the source of law that is not directly controlled by 
states.49  Even so, states do exercise some influence here, because 
the state governments choose the representatives of such 
international organizations.50  Judicial bodies can also play a role 
by offering authoritative interpretations on ill defined areas of 
the law. While the ICJ is limited in this respect by Article 59, 
which proscribes the precedential value for the World Court’s 
decisions,51 other international and domestic courts, including 
Nuremberg, the ICTY and the ICTR are not so limited.  The ICC, 
as a permanent judicial body, has the potential to exercise 
considerable influence over the content of international criminal 
law, and the ICC’s decisions will have precedential value, at least 
for future cases heard under the statute itself.52 
 
 47 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1946, 59 Stat. 1055, 8 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
 48 FALK, supra note 24. 
 49 U.N. CHARTER art. 24. 
 50 The European Parliament is an important exception. 
 51 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 47, art. 59. 
 52 Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some 
Preliminary Reflections, 10 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 144, 157-158 
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The International Criminal Court was established by a 
multilateral treaty negotiated by the representatives of sovereign 
states.53  As such, it is not an organ of the United Nations, nor is 
it functionally a part of any other international organization, but 
the statute does give particular privileges to various United 
Nations organs.  The treaty, normally referred to as the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court, like any treaty, is 
only binding on those states that have formally ratified it.  The 
Rome Statute establishes the court and gives it jurisdiction over 
persons “for the most serious crimes of international concern” as 
provided for in Article 1 of the treaty.54  It also gives the court 
“international legal personality.”55 
The Rome Statute gives the court jurisdiction over the 
crimes of Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, 
and it specifically defines those crimes in Articles 5-8.56  The 
Rome Statute also gives the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of 
Aggression but only if and when the states agree to a definition 
of that crime via an amendment to Article 5 of the ICC statute.57  
Such an amendment would need to be ratified or accepted by 
seven-eighths of the states that are ICC members before it would 
come into effect, and cannot be formally considered until July 
2009.58  This procedure could also be used to add additional 
crimes to the jurisdiction of the court in the future.  There are 
some very specific restrictions on when the ICC can exercise its 
jurisdiction, which will be discussed after the main structures of 
the court have been outlined. 
Part IV of the Rome Statute, Articles 34-52, provide for the 
election of eighteen judges, a prosecutor and deputy prosecutor 
by the Assembly of States Party to the ICC.59  The registrar of 
the court is elected by the judges.60  The Assembly of States 
Parties is composed of a representative from each state that 
ratifies the Rome Statute.  The Assemblies organization and 
administrative powers over the other organs of the court are 
described in Part 11 of the statute, Articles 112-118.61 
The jurisdiction of the court is complementary to the 
 
(1999) (stating that Article 10 of the Rome Statute, which stipulates that the Rome 
Statute is not intended to modify any existing provisions of international law for purposes 
other than those of the statute, does not block the ICC from following its own precedents). 
 53 Rome Statute, supra note 2. 
 54 Id. art. 1. 
 55 Id. art. 4. 
 56 Id. arts. 5-8. 
 57 Id. art. 5. 
 58 Id. arts. 121, 123. 
 59 Id. arts. 34-52. 
 60 Id. art. 43. 
 61 Id. arts.112-118. 
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jurisdiction of national courts, which also presumably have the 
authority to prosecute the international law crimes covered by 
the Rome Statute.62  This concept of concurrent jurisdiction was 
labeled “complementarity” during the ICC negotiations.63  
Complementarity means simply that the court’s jurisdiction 
overlaps without allowing the supranational court to act as an 
appellate court for domestic criminal trials.  In general, a case is 
inadmissible before the ICC if it is being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State with jurisdiction “unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution . . . .”64  In other words, the ICC is intended to defer 
to trials by states in their domestic legal systems.  The 
jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to handling cases where 
national courts fail to prosecute.  The ICC statute adopts the 
traditional legal norm against double jeopardy, so the ICC will 
not hear cases where a domestic court has already rendered a not 
guilty verdict, unless it can be shown that the domestic trial was 
a show-trial intended to shield the accused.65  The statute does 
give the ICC judges the authority to determine whether or not a 
state is genuinely willing and able to prosecute, and therefore, 
whether or not the ICC prosecutor can investigate any particular 
case.66 
This feature does represent a significant change in the 
sovereign rights of states.  For the first time, it allows for a 
supranational review of national judicial systems decisions.  This 
feature was viewed as essential by advocates of a strong court, 
because otherwise, governments could always shield their 
citizens from prosecution by the ICC by holding a show trial.67  
Rod Jensen has commented that this feature of the court’s 
jurisdiction compels states that want to avoid the ICC prosecutor 
from intervening in events that take place on their territory to 
adopt criminal legislation to enable the prosecution of those 
crimes under their domestic law.68  If ICC member states fail to 
adopt such legislation they invite a determination by the ICC 
prosecutor that the state is unable to prosecute. 
While the ICC does have the authority to determine whether 
or not decisions taken in national courts were genuine 
 
 62 Id. art. 1, pmbl. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. art. 17. 
 65 Id. arts. 17, 20. 
 66 Id. at arts. 18, 19. 
 67 For an early example of an non-governmental organizations policy paper arguing 
this point, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ESTABLISHING A JUST, FAIR AND EFFECTIVE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 14 (1994). 
 68 Jensen, supra note 14, at 181. 
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prosecutions, this is not nearly so broadly defined as a general 
appellate review power.  This relationship between national 
courts and the ICC was critical to the willingness of States to 
establish a permanent international criminal court, and the exact 
specification of this relationship was a central issue in the 
negotiations.69 
The court can exercise its jurisdiction over the core crimes 
whenever they take place on the territory of a state that has 
ratified the statute, or when the perpetrator is the national of a 
state party.70  Additionally, the ICC’s statute allows the Security 
Council of the United Nations to refer cases when they take place 
anywhere in the world,71 using its powers to regulate 
international peace and security under Chapter 7 of the United 
Nations Charter.72  Significantly, the Rome Statute does not 
grant the ICC universal jurisdiction over Genocide, or any of the 
other crimes, even though the 1947 Genocide Convention does 
give municipal courts the authority to prosecute that crime 
regardless of where in the world it occurs.73  The ICC can only 
exercise its jurisdiction if a state party or the Security Council 
refers a situation where crimes have allegedly occurred to the 
prosecutor, or if the prosecutor has information indicating that 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the court have been committed 
and he receives authorization from the pre-trial chamber of 
judges to open an investigation.74  Finally, the ICC only has 
jurisdiction over crimes that were committed after the Rome 
Statute entered into force on July 1st, 2002.75 
IV. SOVEREIGNTY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ICC FOR STATE PARTIES 
The International Criminal Court is dependent on sovereign 
states in order for it to function effectively.  However, it also 
creates incentives that are likely to modify state behavior in 
significant ways.  Over time, that modified behavior will likely 
change peoples’ expectations around the world about the 
enforcement of criminal sanctions for gross human rights abuses.  
These changes will be brought about through the exercise of 
individual states’ sovereign rights and privileges, not by 
undermining them. 
 
 69 See, e.g., Press Release, USG for Legal Affairs and U.N. Legal Counsel, May 18, 
1998, available at http://www.un.org/icc/usgpress.htm. 
 70 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12. 
 71 Id. art. 13 (b). 
 72 U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. 
 73 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra 
note 20. 
 74 Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 13-15. 
 75 Id. art. 11. 
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The ICC creates incentives in two different ways.  First, as 
its founders intended, it creates an incentive for states to be more 
consistent in punishing violations of international criminal law 
that occur on their territory.  However, the first few 
investigations that the ICC has undertaken in Uganda and the 
Congo, and the recent request for Court action in Burundi, 
suggest another dynamic that is likely to develop between states 
and the ICC.76  Second, for weak states that have difficulty 
maintaining law and order in their own territory, the ICC creates 
a tremendous incentive and a standing mechanism to request 
international assistance in carrying out investigations and trials 
of gross human rights abusers.  This is a type of burden shifting 
that transfers responsibility from the individual state to the 
International Criminal Court. 
Of course, given its own resource constraints, the ICC will be 
tremendously limited in the number of cases it can take on this 
basis.  To combat this problem, the ICC is permitted to take 
funding donations from private sources.77  One hopes that a 
sufficient number of governments, foundations, and/or private 
individuals will be willing to donate funds to ensure that the 
most egregious cases of violations of international criminal law 
will be adequately investigated and prosecuted.  However, it is 
far from certain that the potential donor pool is equal to the task 
of providing enough funds to deal with what may be an 
unfortunately large number of war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. 
For state parties, the most intrusive changes in sovereignty 
norms will appear when the ICC prosecutes a case with respect 
to events that took place on that state’s territory or involving its 
citizens.  The power of the ICC prosecutor to conduct on site 
investigations under Part 9 of the ICC statute was an extremely 
contentious issue during the ICC negotiations.78  The Rome 
Statute envisions two different scenarios for the capacity of the 
ICC prosecutor to conduct “on-site” investigations.79  In the ideal 
situation, the state party on whose territory the investigation is 
being conducted will be willing to cooperate with the 
investigation.  In that case, the Rome Statute provides for 
elaborate set of notification requirements designed to facilitate 
 
 76 For more information on these ICC investigations, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases. 
html (discussing the investigation in Uganda and Congo); http://globalsolutions.org/ 
programs/law_justice/news/burundi.html (discussing Burundi). 
 77 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 116. 
 78 Fabricio Guariglia, International Law Criminal Procedures: Investigation and 
Prosecution, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME 
STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTS 227, 231 (Roy S. Lee ed. 1999). 
 79 Id. 
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close cooperation between the prosecutor’s office and the relevant 
state party.80 
However, it was also felt that it would be important for the 
prosecutor to have some power to conduct interviews even when 
the state was either completely ineffective, and therefore unable 
to facilitate the ICC prosecutor’s investigation, or in situations 
where the state was unwilling to cooperate.81  In those cases, the 
ICC statute gives the prosecutor’s office some authority, in 
carefully limited circumstances, to conduct interviews of 
witnesses on the state’s territory without the presence of state 
officials, but only under the close supervision of the judges of the 
ICC’s pre-trial chamber.82  This power of the ICC prosecutor can 
only be exercised on the territory of state parties. 
This later scenario is a substantial change from the normal 
sovereign prerogatives of states.  Still, it is an arrangement that 
states only enter into by voluntarily ratifying the ICC statute.  A 
state’s willingness to do this can be understood when looked at in 
conjunction with the emerging standard of popular sovereignty 
discussed above.  By ratifying the ICC statute, sovereign 
governments are attempting to ensure that if the rule of law 
should break down in their societies, resulting in massive 
violations of international criminal law, they, via the 
international community, have the capacity to bring the 
individual perpetrators to justice.   
This international intervention could be interpreted as a step 
toward restoring the legitimate sovereignty of the people, since in 
a time of lawless conflict, the true sovereign authority of the 
people would be incapable of expression.  Because of this, 
sovereign states feel a need to ratify the ICC statute, granting 
investigative powers to the ICC prosecutor and judges in 
advance. 
V. SOVEREIGNTY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ICC  
FOR NON-STATE PARTIES 
The central legal implication for states that have not ratified 
the Rome Statute is that their nationals could be tried by the 
ICC if they commit crimes encompassed by the ICC within the 
territory of a state that has ratified the Rome Statute.83  
Additionally, non-state parties’ could be tried through the 
Security Council mechanism, even with respect to events that 
 
 80 Id. at 231-32. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 232-33. 
 83 Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12. 
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happen on the territory of a non-state party.84  These 
developments, while significant, do not substantially change the 
legal situation that United Nations member states faced prior to 
the establishment of the ICC.  As a matter of power politics, the 
ICC may command more authority to bring suspects to justice 
than would be the case with municipal legal systems of many less 
powerful states.  As a result, the ICC may make deliberate 
political action by states to shield persons from accountability 
more difficult.  However, the view that the ICC statute creates 
new legal obligations for non-state parties cannot be sustained.  
To the extent that the Court may have an impact on the exercise 
of non-state parties’ sovereign rights, it does so in a way that is 
perfectly consistent with existing international law. 
In the closing days of the Clinton Administration David 
Scheffer lobbied for states supporting the ICC to agree to limit 
the ability of the court to detain official personnel of non-state 
parties.  He said, “we believe there should be a means to preclude 
the automatic surrender to the Court of official personnel of a 
non-party State that acts responsibly in the international 
community and is willing to exercise and capable of exercising 
complementarity with respect to its own personnel.”85  Scheffer 
referred to this as “a fundamental issue [that] needs to be 
resolved [whose] . . . . outcome would open the door for the 
United States to become the good neighbor to the Court.”86  Of 
course, this issue was never resolved in a way that was 
satisfactory to the United States government. 
According to a crucial rule of international law, states cannot 
be obligated to obey a treaty unless it agrees to so obligate 
itself.87  Diane Amann has argued forcefully that the ICC creates 
“non-consensual” legal jurisdiction in a way that violates the 
principle that treaties are not binding on non-signatory states.88  
The governments of the United States, China, and India have 
also complained that the ICC Statute impinges unfairly on their 
sovereign rights.  As Amann rightly points out, it is essential to 
the quasi- democratic legitimacy of international law that states 
cannot be made to accept international legal obligations except 
 
 84 Id. art. 13. 
 85 David Scheffer, Statement Before the Sixth Committee of the 53rd General 
Assembly (U.N.): The International Criminal Court (Oct. 18, 2000), available at 
http://www.un.int/usa/98_179.htm. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1968, arts. 34-38, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, entered into force Jan. 27 1980, available at www.un.org/law/ilc/texts 
/treaties.htm. 
 88 Diane Marie Amann, The International Criminal Court and the Sovereign State, 
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through their own consent.  Careful analysis shows however that 
the Rome Statute is not guilty of creating new legal obligations 
for non-state parties. 
The legal impact of the ICC’s establishment on the citizens of 
non-state parties is that there is one additional forum in which 
they may be tried for war crimes, crime against humanity, and 
genocide.89  Such persons could already have been tried in the 
courts of a foreign state if they committed those crimes in that 
state before the establishment of the ICC.  In many cases, they 
could have been subject to trial in a foreign state court even for 
acts committed in their home state under universal jurisdiction 
rules.90  As a legal matter, it seems there is little difference 
between individuals being held responsible for violations of 
municipal law in states they visit versus being held responsible 
for violations of international law in states they visit.  The 
traditional rules of international law have long maintained that 
states have the jurisdiction to prosecute foreigners for conduct on 
their territory.91  As many advocates of the ICC have pointed out, 
there is no logical reason why such states should be barred from 
cooperating by a multilateral treaty to punish conduct which 
each of them had a clear right to punish individually. 
Amann argues that this transfer of jurisdiction from national 
legal systems to a supranational court is illegitimate.92  The 
central line of reasoning is that ICC jurisdiction is substantially 
different from one state transferring its territorial judicial 
authority to another state.  Here the argument relies on the fact 
that many states have been reluctant to grant such authority in 
the context of European judicial cooperation.93  However, arguing 
that states have been reluctant for political reasons to engage in 
this practice is not the same thing as arguing that there is a well 
recognized rule of international law that disallows the practice. 
Amann goes on to argue that the ICC is different from states 
exercising jurisdiction over crimes on their territory individually 
because ICC decisions are much more likely to have precedent-
setting effects.94  She cites as evidence of this, the decision by the 
 
 89 See, e.g., Jerry Fowler, Not Fade Away: The International Criminal Court and the 
State of Sovereignty, 2 SAN DIEGO INT’L J.L. 125 (2001) (book review); Cosmos Eubany, 
Justice for Some? U.S. Efforts Under Article 98 to Escape the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 103 (2003). 
 90  RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 41. 
 91 Emer de Vattel, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 
(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Hein & Co., Inc. 1995) (1758). 
 92 Amann, supra note 88, at 194. 
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Doe I v. Unocal,95 
wherein the judges relied in part on a legal standard developed 
by the UN ad hoc criminal tribunals.96  However, it is simply 
incorrect to consider this as an imposition on American 
sovereignty.  The judges in the American court were not 
compelled to follow the international precedent in this case.  
Instead, they chose to do so.  In so doing, they were exercising 
U.S. sovereign rights, by voluntarily complying with emerging 
international standards.  This is a consensual acceptance of the 
legitimacy of international norms, not an imposition by a 
supranational court that is compelled against the will of a state 
sovereign. 
If the ICC develops into a globally respected judicial 
institution, there is every reason to believe it will issue decisions 
interpreting the laws of war in ways that diverse legal scholars 
will find persuasive.  The ICC may indeed have a definitive 
impact on shaping the legal enforcement norms concerning these 
international crimes.  Politically, this undoubtedly weakens the 
ability of the United States and other great powers to shape the 
development of these international norms to their own liking.  
This fact is at the core of some of the opposition to the court 
within the US Government.  Of course, the United States can 
resist normative developments that occur at the ICC and limit 
their tendency to be enshrined in Customary International Law 
by consistently objecting to the ICC’s practice.  This is 
undoubtedly part of the unstated logic behind the campaign of 
the Bush Administration to belittle the ICC at every available 
turn.  But the precedent setting effects of the ICC could always 
be resisted by US judges if they desire.  The Rome Statute clearly 
states that its contents cannot “be interpreted as limiting or 
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of 
international law for purposes other than this statute.”97  This 
gives sufficient latitude to municipal judges to reach their own 
interpretations of provisions of international humanitarian law 
even if they are at odds with rulings by ICC judges. 
All of this means that the complaints that the ICC creates 
unfair legal effects on non-state parties, through precedent or 
some other mechanism, are really not substantial. 
A. The ICC and the Relationship Between Law and War 
Since 2001, the policy of the United States government has 
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been to defend the idea that the United States is entitled to use 
force preemptively as an extension of the traditional right to self-
defense enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.98  A number 
of American legal scholars have perplexingly defended the 
legality of this proposition.99  The American position does not 
recognize a similar right on the part of other states to use force 
against the United States if they feel similarly threatened.  This 
lack of reciprocity will ultimately undermine the credibility of 
international law itself if the United States continues to pursue 
this route. 
Curtis Doebbler and Maha Eid argue persuasively that, at 
best, the legal reasoning behind these arguments involves a 
selective interpretation of existing law, while, at worst, an 
attempt by respected scholars to ensure their own access to the 
corridors of power by saying what powerful government officials 
want to hear.100  This issue is relevant here because it is essential 
to understand the legal debate about the impact of the ICC 
statute on non-state parties in the context of this larger political 
question regarding the relationship between US national security 
strategy and international law.  Much of the world is now quite 
convinced that the United States aims to exempt itself entirely 
from compliance with the rules of international humanitarian 
law.  The U.S. need not accede to the ICC Statute if it does not 
believe it is in U.S. interests to do so.  Still, it is unnecessary for 
the United States to complain that the establishment of the ICC 
unfairly impinges on U.S. sovereignty.  The U.S. may not like the 
existence of the court, but it has no legal right to prevent other 
states from establishing it and attempting to develop the ICC 
into an effective institution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Others have argued that the debate between the United 
States and supporters of the ICC about the effect of the Court’s 
statute is, in effect, a conflict between two differently valued 
positions: preserving traditional sovereignty rules of 
international law versus ensuring an end to impunity for the 
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perpetrators of severe international crimes.101 
However, I would argue that the Rome Statute was actually 
careful to balance these values.  As we have seen, it is true that 
the existence of the Court potentially impacts the citizens of non-
state parties.  However, it does so in a way that does not 
substantially change their legal rights.  As a practical matter 
however, it increases the likelihood of prosecution because it 
establishes a court with considerable independence from outside 
political forces.  Because the ICC is a supranational institution, it 
will not be subject to the same diplomatic pressures as the courts 
of less-powerful states.  This is the real source of the hostility 
toward the ICC’s impact on non-state parties and it really is not 
a legal complaint.  Rather, it is a political one.  The 
establishment of the ICC may very well lessen the capacity of 
powerful states to use extra-legal political pressure to block the 
prosecution of persons accused of ICC crimes when they see such 
prosecutions as contrary to their national interests.  This is an 
objection to the ICC’s political impact on (some) sovereign states 
de facto autonomy.  It is not a reasonable legal objection to the 
ICC’s impact on transforming the legal concept of state 
sovereignty. 
 
 
 101 See generally Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic 
Jurisdiction Consistent With the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 
MIL. L. REV. 20, 27-28 (2001) (describing the views of the proponents of the International 
Criminal Court that state sovereignty should be subordinated to the greater good of the 
world community).  But see Scheffer, supra note 85 (describing the United State’s position 
that the ICC interferes with state sovereignty). 
